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Abstract
What is freedom of religion? What is its relation to other values
in society? How do we respect religious heritage in democracies -
particularly in multi-cultural democracies that contain many
potentially conflicting - values? How far can one express one's religious
heritage? In what follows, I want to discuss these issues with a view
to determining whether some kind of secularism is the best public
policy to pursue in order to respect and promote freedom of religion
and one's religious heritage, particularly in contemporary liberal
democracies.
Introduction
One of the most basic rights in national constitutions and in international
declarations and related documents is freedom of religion. It is a cornerstone
of liberal democracies, and it is formally recognised by all the states that
are members of the United Nations. Freedom of religion is a freedom of
individuals, but it is also recognised as a freedom of collectivities in the
sense that not only individuals but communities have a right to the respect
of their religious heritage and traditions. Religious freedom was one of the
motives for emigration to the 'new world', and calls for it today are part of
the democratic reforms taking place in much of the 'old world'.
Yet freedom of religion has been at the centre of much recent
debate; in India, it comes up in discussions concerning restrictions on
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'conversion'2; in Iran, such freedom has been said not to include what
some call 'apostasy'; and in the United States, it has been involved in a
number of legal cases, such as having Christmas trees or depictions of the
Ten Commandments on public property, or having prayer in publicly-
funded schools. This freedom has also been accused of being incompatible
with other values - with the value of human equality (for those religions
where this is allegedly not emphasized or respected), with the value of
public security, with the value of government neutrality, and so on.
What is freedom of religion? What is its relation to other values in
society? How do we respect religious heritage in democracies - particularly
in multi-cultural democracies - that contain many potentially conflicting
values? How far can one express one's religious heritage?
In what follows, I want to discuss these issues with a view to
determining whether some kind of secularism is the best public policy to
pursue in order to respect and promote freedom of religion and one's
religious heritage, particularly in contemporary liberal democracies.
Cases
Cases where we find a tension or apparent conflict between religious
heritage or religious freedom and other values are all too common.
One case familiar to many is that of the wearing of the Islamic
hijab or headscarf in western Europe. For example, in France, a law banning
Islamic headscarves in public schools was adopted on March 3, 2004.
On that date, the French Senate voted 276 to 20 in favor of the law,
following a similar vote by the National Assembly on February 10 (where
it won with a vote of 494 to 36). In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof -
Germany's highest court - decided in September 2003 that there could be
restrictions on the wearing of religious dress for those employed in public
service occupations in the Länder (states), as long as there were no state
laws against it3 - and on December 9, 2003, the government of Bavaria
unveiled a draft law restricting such attire.  In Belgium, in December 2003,
two senators proposed a law prohibiting the wearing of the hijab and
other overt religious symbols in state schools. And, on June 29, 2004, the
European Court of Human Rights allowed that "Banning Muslim
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headscarves in state schools does not violate the freedom of religion and
is a valid way to counter Islamic fundamentalism4".
The arguments against such bans often appeal to the value of one's
religious heritage and to freedom of religion. Some say that not only does
wearing the hijab help to preserve a woman's modesty, but the right to
wear the hijab is "part of one's identity" as a Muslim and even a religious
duty. And they would say that any society that respects individual freedom
should not restrict the expression of a person's beliefs and particularly of
one's identity.
Nevertheless, those who defend such bans claim that limiting the
wearing of the hijab - and thereby restricting the expression of one's
religious heritage - are consistent with fundamental democratic values,
such as equality and security. For example, it is claimed that very few
women wear the head scarf voluntarily; that not allowing girls to wear it to
school in fact respects the wishes of the majority of parents who are afraid
to openly resist the fundamentalist elements in their communities, and that
forbidding it serves to protect pupils against fundamentalist influences.
Others have argued that banning the hijab reflects basic social values such
as the principle of state neutrality (or secularism); thus, in Belgium, the
proposed law states that "[t]he government should remain neutral…in all
circumstances and be represented as such…that means no distinctive
religious symbols or veils for police officers, judges, clerks or teachers at
public schools.'5 In short, while a person has the right to wear a hijab or
headscarf in public, it does not mean that she has the right to do so as a
public employee, or that her freedom to express her religious heritage is
limited if, in applying for, or obtaining a teaching position, she is prohibited
from wearing attire that identifies oneself as a member of a religious group.
A second kind of case of conflict that may be familiar to some is
that between parental rights to preserve the family's religious heritage and
children's rights - particularly concerning the mental and physical health
and education of children. In a recent case in Toronto, Ontario, Canada,
the one-month old daughter of Jehovah's Witness parents required a blood
transfusion to treat the girl's potentially life-threatening congestive heart
failure.6 The parents claimed the transfusion was unnecessary, but principally
objected that, because of their religious beliefs against blood transfusions,
the medical personnel should not carry out the procedure. On the other
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side, the Ontario Children's Aid Society argued that they had an obligation
to a "child in need of protection" under the Ontario Child Welfare Act -
and courts in Canada subsequently held that "freedom of religion, guaranteed
under s. 2(a) of the Charter [i.e., the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms], does not include the imposition of religious practices which
threaten the safety, health or life of the child." The courts determined that,
"although the freedom of belief is broad, the freedom to act upon those
beliefs is narrower, because it is subject to such limitations as are necessary
to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."7 A similar
example is that of a 1972 United States Supreme Court case. The
defendants, who were members of the Amish faith, refused to send their
children, aged 14 and 15, to public school after the children had completed
the eighth grade. They claimed that the US Constitution's guarantee of
freedom of religion "protects a community's right to live in accordance
with its tradition and beliefs, even if this limits the individual freedom of
children."8 On the other hand, the state argued that the freedom of religion
does not extend so far as to deprive children of basic goods, such as
education.9
Another kind of case focuses on freedoms of speech and of
expression of one's religious beliefs, and the prohibition of comments that
are deemed to be hurtful to members of certain identifiable groups. A
recent example in Canada concerned a small advertisement in a local
newspaper, the Saskatoon Star Phoenix. On June 30, 1997, Mr Hugh
Owens, an evangelical Protestant, placed an advertisement in that
newspaper that "consisted of a pictograph of two men holding hands
superimposed with a circle and slash  -  the symbol of something forbidden
-  and a list of Bible verses condemning the practice of homosexuality."10
Three gay men filed a complaint with the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Board, claiming that, as a result of the ad, they "were exposed to hatred,
ridicule and their dignity was affronted on the basis of their sexual
orientation."11
There are many other cases where one can see potential - or
actual - tensions or conflicts between freedom of religion or professing
one's religious heritage and other social values. Such conflicts may be
even more dramatic in countries where there is an explicit policy of
multiculturalism or of pluralism.
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Democratic Values
Many of the countries in the world today express - or claim to express -
'democratic values.' What are these 'democratic values'? (Here, I am simply
being descriptive; I am making no judgement about whether these values
are essential to democracies, or whether all of these values ought to be
present.)
Perhaps the first, and most fundamental of these values is "human
rights." The history of human rights is a lengthy one, and need not be
recounted here.12 In general, however, these rights began to come to
prominence in eighteenth-century Europe, largely as a way of restricting
or limiting the arbitrary authority of monarchical regimes.
Today, such rights are enshrined in national constitutions and bills
of rights (e.g., in Canada, Australia, France, India, and United States),
and we see them as well in international documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed by the United Nations
in 1948. These rights serve as "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations," and the UDHR refers to "the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family"
(Preamble). Among the rights enumerated in this Declaration are "life,
liberty and the security of the person" (Art. 3), dignity and the free
development of [human] personality (Art. 27), peaceful assembly and
association (Art. 20), and fundamental equality and cultural rights (e.g., to
participate in the building of culture). But also present is the right to freedom
of religion (Art. 18).
In many countries, of course, there are other important - and
fundamental - values in addition to human rights (though these values may
be in, or be implied by, articles in the UDHR). These values include: the
rule of law; individual autonomy (i.e., the pursuit of one's good in one's
own way); social harmony and stability - and, more broadly, peace and
security; values of character (such as loyalty, self-control, independence,
and the like); the obligation to protect the weak (especially children) and
those who are not able to claim their rights; the commitment to truth and to
the pursuit of truth (so that one's activities and exercise of one's freedoms
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are more than just acting on whim); the commitment to the community in
which one lives, grows, works, and participates; one's national, religious,
and ethnic heritage; and so on.
Yet we also find another important value - that of diversity or
cultural, ethical, religious (and other) plurality. Many believe that not only
is this diversity a good thing, but that it is related to each person's dignity
and autonomy. And thus, in some nations, we find another value - a value
that has become a key element of public policy. This is multiculturalism.
What is 'multiculturalism'? "Multiculturalism or cultural pluralism is a policy,
ideal, or reality that emphasizes the unique characteristics of different
cultures in the world," that holds that "several different cultures (rather
than one national culture) can co-exist peacefully and equitably in a single
country," and "supports policies of maintaining ethnic identities, values and
lifestyles within an overarching framework of common laws and shared
institutions."13 (Emphases mine). The intent of such a policy is to ensure
genuine pluralism - not a 'melting pot' (a term that is sometimes used to
describe the mixing of cultures and the development of a 'new' culture in
the United States).
Is multiculturalism implied by other democratic values? It is possible
that a state may be democratic without being multicultural, though now it
is less and less likely. Even though equality, autonomy, and the emphasis
of diversity over unity may often seem to lead to a thin, legal and purely
formal social unity, it is clear that multiculturalism is a value that has a
broad recognition, and which has been officially adopted in a number of
democratic states.
Religious Heritage and Freedom of Religion14
Appeals for the respect of religious heritage have often drawn on the right
to freedom of religion. In his message of September 1, 1980, for example,
Pope John Paul II wrote of "The Freedom of Conscience and of Religion,"
and on the celebration of the World Day of Peace (January 1) in 1991, he
wrote "If You Want Peace, Respect the Conscience of Every Person."
Freedom of religion is a freedom that is recognized (and, presumably,
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guaranteed) in various Declarations, Charters and Bills of Rights, and it is
often listed as among the most basic or fundamental of these human rights.
Thus, in the UDHR we read: "Everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance" (Art. 18). (And this is closely connected with
the following article: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers" [Article 19].) Similarly, in the first amendment
to the Constitution of the United States we read: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech" (emphasis mine).
This freedom or right is found in a number of international
documents and protocols which expand on the UDHR. For example, the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981) sets out the minimum
international standards for the elimination of such discrimination. Its
description of freedom of religion is virtually identical to that found in the
UDHR (Art. 18). But notice how far it extends!
Article 1
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.
William Sweet  7
The importance of preserving one's religious heritage is an essential
part of this freedom. For example, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic
Minorities (1992) provides that 'States shall protect the existence and
the… religious… identity of minorities within their respective territories'
(Art. 1). Further, it provides that minorities have the 'right to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion… freely and without
any interference or any form of discrimination' (Art. 2, emphasis mine).
What does it mean to have such a right to freedom of religion, and
to enjoy, profess, and practice it? How does this recognize the value of
religious heritage? By such a freedom or right, here, those who have drafted
and approved these documents do not mean to refer just to "tolerance" or
to "freedom of opinion" - for religious freedom is a special kind of freedom
that goes beyond freedom of opinion or belief or speech. It is not just a
freedom to choose, but more like a freedom to commit oneself, and it
presumes that one is seeking the truth  -  how to lead one's life  -  and not
adopting a belief for some other purpose (e.g., to avoid military service).
Thus, freedom of religion is not just freedom of opinion or belief; it is a
freedom to act on one's beliefs in shaping one's life.
Freedom of religion - including engaging in and preserving one's
religious heritage - is a basic right in these documents. It is, perhaps first
and foremost, an individual right. It is usually taken to entail that each
person has a right to choose his or her own religion and religious tradition,
and to practice what one has chosen - but also to protect those who do
not want to practice religion at all.  Some would also say that it is a 'collective
right' - a right of collectivities - which involves "the right of the members of
any religion to maintain the beliefs, practices and symbols of their religion."
Such individual and group rights are related. It would seem that the
individual's right would be empty if there were not also a corresponding
"right of the group as a collective entity"; there could not be an individual
freedom of religion unless there were the sets of institutions and practices
found in communities.
Given the focus on religious heritage and the respect for religious
freedom in the context of other, basic, values, one must ask how far these
rights extend.
8  Prajñâ Vihâra
At first glance, the value of religious heritage and the freedom to
participate in it are very great, for both seem to be part and parcel of a
basic principle to pursue one's own good in one's own way. Thus we see,
in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), that, "In
accordance with article I of the present Declaration" the following freedoms
are included:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief,
and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or
humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary
articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these
areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these
purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other
contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate
leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or
belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and
communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international
levels.
Nor does this "freedom" ignore the rights of parents in determining
and passing on religious heritage to their children: Article 5 of this
Declaration reads:
1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the
child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance with
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their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which
they believe the child should be brought up.
2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in
the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents
or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to
receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or
legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.
Clearly, the extent of freedom of religion, described in these
documents, is very broad; each person can pursue "whatever belief of his
choice" and "manifest [it] in worship, observance, etc." As John Paul II
writes, "It is essential that the right to express one's own religious convictions
publicly and in all domains of civil life be ensured if human beings are to
live together in peace."15
In short, then, freedom of religion and the supports necessary to
maintaining one's religious heritage are guaranteed by international
documents as well as by many of the charters and declarations of rights
that we find in nation states.
Nevertheless, such a freedom is not absolute. In the constitutional
documents, and in the recent debate, freedom of religion and the respect
of one's religious heritage are to be allowed - but, many insist, only to the
extent that they do not provide "undue hardship" on others in the community
and/or can be given "reasonable accommodation."  Thus, the freedom of
religion and respect of religious heritage can be limited in a variety of
ways; they are subject to like, and larger, values.
In the UDHR, freedoms seem to exist only within a context of
duties. According to the UDHR, Article 29, "Everyone has duties to the
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality
is possible." (Art. 29, section 1). Moreover, such freedom and values
must respect other values - the rights of others. They must not harm the
physical or mental health of others (i.e., they are subject to the 'harm
principle'), they must respect "public order", and they must respect "the
just requirements of morality" - which includes 'the natural law.' Article 29
continues by stating that
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In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (Art.
29, section 2)
Similarly, in his Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace
(1991) (section 3), John Paul II writes: "To claim that one has a right to
act according to conscience, but without at the same time acknowledging
the duty to conform one's conscience to the truth and to the law
which God himself has written on our hearts, in the end means nothing
more than imposing one's limited personal opinion" (emphasis mine).
We see such 'limits' stated in a number of international documents.
In the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981)
Art. 5, section 5, we read: "Practices of a religion or belief in which a child
is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his
full development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present
Declaration." In the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 1,
we are reminded that such rights exist, but are "subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society." Indeed, in some national laws 'harmfulness
to oneself' is a limitation (where there are restrictions on such religious
practices as 'snake-handling'); offensiveness may be as well.
Nevertheless, despite the recognition of such limitations, it is
generally acknowledged that religious freedom should be allowed, at least
to the extent that it does not provide "undue hardship" and/or can be given
"reasonable accommodation."
Sources of Tension between Religious Heritage and Other Values
The reasons why religious heritage (including freedom of religion) and
other values are in tension in many democracies - and particularly
democracies that are multiculturalist - are, perhaps, obvious. Nevertheless,
it will be useful to signal just a few of them.
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First, it is difficult to determine what counts as a 'religion' - and
what the heritage is that a believer may wish to appeal to or draw on. The
number of 'religions' is increasing exponentially - according to a recent
news report, there are two new religions in the world each day16 - and the
specific character of what counts as a religion is far from settled. So how
can one non-arbitrarily determine when such a freedom may properly be
claimed?
Second, we must take account of the special status of religion (in
light of other values) - as well as the special status accorded to 'freedom
of religion', in the way described above. For example, in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedom, section 2, where the most fundamental
rights and freedoms are articulated, we see - first, "freedom of conscience
and religion," and, second, "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication." But the order here is not necessarily a ranking, and it is
difficult (if not impossible) to say, in advance, how much weight these
freedoms actually have relative to one another and in relation to other
values - particularly in light of the article in that Charter that states that all
rights are "subject ... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The specific weight of freedom or religion and of these other values
is all the more unsettled and unstable - both from case to case and overall
- because any assessment may reflect varying public opinion. Nor are
laws and constitutions a firm guarantee of the weight of such values -
particularly since democracies are subject to wide swings in public opinion.
Third, the above-mentioned limitations on freedom of religion are
vague and potentially problematic. We have seen above that one of the
'limits' on this freedom is 'harm to others' (i.e., where the exercise of the
religion threatens or harms public order, general welfare, or 'the just
requirements of morality'). But what these rights or interests are vary from
country to country, and religious groups themselves may understand harm
rather differently (for example, when it concerns initiation rites into religious
communities17). Other limits on religion may be 'harmfulness to oneself' or
'offensiveness,' or the "falsity" of the belief. (While the latter appears
infrequently in legal documents in the west, it is clearly involved where
apostasy is a violation of national law.18) But can such limits be justified?
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Fourth, there are more and more calls by believers for respect of
religious heritage and freedom of religion, and it is increasingly difficult to
determine when and how to respond and, if there are conflicts, how to
adjudicate among them. In multicultural environments, for example, not
only is there a diversity in values, but there are significant differences
concerning which values people rank highest and how they are understood.
There is also no clear answer to how to respond to 'competing' values
(such as the priority of the private over the public; the individualisation of
society; the integration of different cultural groups within a larger community;
the value of diversity; the value - and the possibility - of the integration of
other values into those of the dominant cultures and traditions; and the
value of the policy of tolerance and reasonable accommodation of
diversity).
Related to this is the fact that the expectations of what equality
rights involve -  what one has an equal entitlement to -  have increased;
and that such expectations are not just to toleration, but to support. If so,
and if law is to maintain equality among religious groups, how far must it
guarantee support?
Yet another - a fifth - concern is that there are few, if any, overriding
principles in a democratic, and particularly a multicultural, society -  and
less and less of a sense of a common culture or allegiance or common
good. Indeed, one sometimes detects a fear of any appeal to an overriding
common good or overarching principle, and a suspicion of anyone
promoting such a good.
It may be true that respect for religious heritage and freedom of
religion is unproblematic in itself, but that it brings with it other values -
anti-liberal or anti-democratic values - that may disrupt (such as ethnic or
tribal nationalism) or may even challenge the most dominant values of a
society.19
Therefore, some critics question whether, how, and how far respect
for religious heritage, and freedom of religion, does or should have a place
in multi-cultural and multi-religious democracies.
Responses
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What responses to these tensions are open to us? It seems that there are
at least three.
First, there is simply staying with the status quo - to let courts and
parliaments decide (drawing on philosophical discussions, perhaps, but
standing independent of them). That is, we continue much as we have
been in recent years. Yet this option is unsatisfactory.
To begin with, such an option is unstable. It seems fairly clear that
governments - and democratic institutions in general - have failed so far in
achieving a comfortable balance between respect for religious heritage
and religious freedom, on the one hand, and respect for other values, on
the other. (This is not to attack these institutions, but simply to remind
ourselves of their vulnerability to various pressures.) Parliaments and even
courts are susceptible to shifts in public opinion or changing ideologies,
and sometimes judges 'make law' rather than simply interpret and apply it.
(Here, we can see something of why A.R. Lord saw democracy as tending
to intolerance.20)
Moreover, if we simply continue the status quo, we will likely
accept values and priorities that seem to weigh against any clear resolution
of conflicts or diminution of tensions. Consider, for example, the priority
of freedom over responsibility; the emphasis of private goods over the
public good; the individualisation of society; and the refusal to address, in
many cases, whether, how and to what extent, to integrate or coordinate
the various systems of values that we find in modern communities. These
will serve only to perpetuate the existing tensions and problems.
Finally, the status quo leaves unanswered the question of what are
the legitimate limits on freedom of religion, and it leaves unanswered whether
the limits that we have now (e.g., in law) are in fact legitimate. Staying with
the status quo is, then, no option.
A second option that might be considered to address current
conflicts and tensions, is a paternalistic or directive one - i.e., that the state
provide an overriding principle or direction in how to solve conflicts
between freedom of religion and other values. Such direction could involve
the imposition of a broad common good - or even the institution of an
established religion. But this solution would clearly not be acceptable to
many in a democratic society - for they would argue that a hallmark of a
liberal democratic society is the right to pursue one's own conception of
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the good in one's own way (providing it does not harm others), which
precludes having or imposing any overriding conception of the good. And
even if one could find a dominant conception of the good that people
happen to agree on, it is far from clear that it would be one that could last
over time.
One might revise this view slightly by proposing that the state
could argue for or promote a (larger) common good, but not impose it -
as it does, on a much smaller scale, in promoting healthy lifestyles - though
this, too, I suggest is impracticable and at best something that can be
successful only over a long term. Alternately, one might propose that,
while there cannot be - for reasons of practicality - a broad-based common
good, states might nevertheless consider imposing limits, beyond those
described above, on religious practices and religious expression, to ensure
that appeals to religious freedom are authentic and made sincerely. States
might insist that, if there is to be freedom of religion, then those making
appeals to it must accept corresponding religious (or non-religious)
responsibilities. These statements of corresponding responsibilities might
come from within the faith traditions themselves, or the state might attempt
to define responsibilities to one's (religious and ethnic) heritage or to one's
presently existing religious community. (Thus, those who wish the benefit
of religious exemptions from certain obligations, such as military service,
must clearly be practicing members 'in good standing' of their faith.) But
the perennial, practical challenge here is, who is competent - and who can
be trusted - to decide fairly what such limits or responsibilities are?
Attempting to introduce overriding principles or values to help to
resolve these competing and conflicting values, then, does not seem to be
a promising option either.
Now, a third option that has been proposed is secularism - i.e., an
explicit state policy of neutrality with regard to religion. It is an option
more or less endorsed by most democratic states, and, interestingly, it is
an option that is embraced by some religious groups. I wish to briefly
consider some of the ways in which we might understand this view, to see
whether it might contain at least the seeds of a viable solution to conflicts
between freedom of religion (including respect for religious heritage) and
(other) democratic values.
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Secularism
Secularism is a vague term, and states which have endorsed a policy of
secularism vary widely in how they understand and apply the policy.
One standard definition of "secularism" is that it is "indifference to
or rejection or exclusion of religion and religious considerations"21; the
term is derived from "secular", which means "concerned with affairs of this
world, worldly, not sacred, not monastic, not ecclesiastical, temporal,
profane, lay, skeptical of religious truth or opposed to religious education,
etc."22 The attitude towards religion here is, we should note, ambiguous;
secularism is not necessarily opposed to religion. In fact, as noted above,
a public policy of secularism has sometimes been embraced by religious
believers. How is it, then, that certain religious groups challenge secularism?
One explanation for this is that there are different kinds of secularism.
There is, to begin with, a 'negative' secularism (such as that which
one not only seems to find in the United States, but found in many communist
countries in the 20th century), which may be close to John Rawls' position
on religious tolerance as described in Political Liberalism. This kind of
secularism envisages that, in the state, there is a freedom from religion -
that is, religion is properly in the private, not the public sphere (because it
allegedly is - as Richard Rorty puts it - a "conversation stopper").23
To be fair, this freedom from religion can admit of degrees. A
'weak' version - such as that of Rawls, for example - would seem to allow
that one can publicly argue for values that may happen to be present in
religion (e.g., as based, for example, on natural law), but not as religious
values. A 'stronger' version - perhaps as was found under communism -
holds that any action on or out of religious conviction must be justified -
that it must be on balance, a social good, or at least not harmful. But in no
way is religion to be introduced into public discourse.
An advantage to either version of 'negative' secularism is that, as
far as it is a freedom from religion, it provides a barrier to 'bogus' religious
claims to social benefits - though of course it is a barrier to all religious
claims. But it is likely to be ineffective (for it is not clear that those having
religious beliefs could 'privatise' their values; it would simply drive religious
beliefs underground), and it puts the state in the position of imposing values,
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i.e., preferring one group of freedoms over another (traditionally basic)
freedom.
A second kind of secularism is 'mitigated' secularism. This seems
to be the one that we find in some Asian countries. Freedom of religion
and expression of one's religious heritage exist, but restrictions on that
freedom are allowed, providing that they do not impose undue hardship
on the adherents.
In such cases, in addition to the recognition of freedom of religion
as a human right, states may also recognize the social value of the
transmission of a religious heritage, or that providing opportunities for
religious expression and worship is a service for at least some of its citizens.
Thus, the state guarantees freedoms of religion and religious practice
providing that i) they do not violate the rights of others; ii) they do not
reasonably risk violating the rights of others; and iii) they do not risk harming
the legitimate interests of others.
Because the state recognizes that providing opportunities for
religious expression is a service, it can ensure reasonable accommodation
of religion, and can even support religion (e.g., through allowing donations
to religious groups to be tax deductible; through subsidizing some of the
expenses of religious institutions and organizations; by providing land or
space to construct a place of worship, and so on.)
Nevertheless, freedom of religion can still be compared with, and
weighed against, other values (e.g., national or international security, values
that deal with equality of women or of alternative lifestyles, etc.). Moreover,
while the expression of religious belief does not deprive one of the right to
some basic social goods (e.g., the equal administration of justice), it does
not follow that all will have equal opportunities to enjoy all non-basic
social goods (e.g., employment in certain occupations). (For example, if
my holy day is Wednesday, my employer does not discriminate if he
nevertheless expects me to work on that day.)
Both negative and mitigated secularism allow, justify, and - in the
case of negative secularism - require the state limiting or restricting religious
expression and related freedoms. But one may well be concerned about
this. For, after all, what are the other rights or interests that the state pays
heed to, in imposing limits on religious freedom? Are such rights (just)
legal rights - i.e., the rights that happen to exist on the law books of a given
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state? And what exactly is the moral weight of a (mere) legal right? Are
such rights sufficient to limit what are generally recognized as fundamental
rights? And even if we allow that there can be legitimate limits on freedom
of religion, based on the legal rights of others, how far do such limits
extend? Do such 'legal' rights justify the state in determining how adherents
of a religious tradition can show their religious commitment, e.g., determining
even the size of the religious symbols that may be worn? And can the state
be an impartial or neutral party in determining the nature and limits of
freedom of religion and the expression of religious heritage?
It is, of course, unavoidable that there be some limits on the freedom
of religion, and that states (specifically, legislatures and the courts) will
properly be called on to determine what these limits are. But this also
effectively places the state in the position of being an arbiter of religious
belief - i.e., of determining which beliefs are fundamental, and which may
be expressed or practiced. For this reason, I would argue that the state
should be involved in such a practice as rarely as possible. Mitigated
secularism, like negative secularism, puts the state in the position of making
'religious' decisions - i.e., decisions about the value of religious heritage
and of certain religious beliefs and practices (e.g., whether some aspects
of religion are more central or important than others, or whether they need
to be allowed to be expressed). But determining the content of belief is
clearly beyond the jurisdiction of authorities of a democratic state.
If secularism is to be a solution to the conflicts and tensions that
arise between the right to freedom of religion and other democratic values,
we need another model of secularism. I would argue that there is another
such model - what I will call 'positive secularism' - though I can provide
only a sketch of this view here.
Positive secularism is a kind of secularism where the state intervenes
as little as possible in how freedom of religion, including the expression of
religious heritage, is respected in relation to other values, and it would
reflect three primary considerations:
1. Legislatures and the courts should have as little as possible to
do with religion.
2. The state - and public institutions in general - should (thereby)
allow for a reasonable presence and accommodation of religion - e.g.,
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that religious believers have access on a par with everyone else to public
goods - but the state needn't (and shouldn't?) provide positive support.
(In other words, since the state normally stands apart from religion, public
institutions cannot restrict the presence of religion in the public sphere, but
they have no positive obligation to ensure that religion be present.)
3. When there are conflicts between freedom of religion and other
values, and when the courts must intervene, the burden of proof should be
shared; where there is a proposal to limit freedom of religion, both sides
should justify their views, but not just by constitutional appeals to 'freedom
of religion' or 'equality rights', but also by referring to other, fundamental
values. (In other words, appeals to freedom of religion, or the right to
equal treatment or the right to non-discrimination would be, by themselves,
insufficient.)
There can, then, be restrictions of freedom of religion, but such
restrictions would be rare. I would add, however, that this does not mean
that the restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion
(including religious expression) would be primarily or solely those
determined by the state. In fact, I would argue that religious groups should
establish limits themselves - recognizing that there are other values and
other groups with values in the state - and that, as far as possible, they
should respect other values without obliging the state to intercede or
interfere by having to determine the relative weight of religious freedom
against other democratic and multiculturalist values. For, once the state is
involved, there is the possibility - or probability - of interference in religious
expression and practice.
What the specific mechanics of such a secularism will be will,
obviously, vary from state to state - but the preceding considerations would
constitute a minimum that must be respected. Such a secularism is
compatible with religious, ethnic, and social diversity, though it does not
require - and in fact may involve abstaining from - a policy of multiculturalism.
This 'positive' secularism is also compatible with a genuine right to freedom
of religion and the free expression of religion without allowing any religious
group to claim a particular political right or privilege over minority religions
or over those without any (particular) religious faith.
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Conclusion
Freedom of religion is a basic human right, and the expression of one's
religious freedom is part and parcel of it. Not only is this freedom a part of
the liberty that is necessary for the development of human personhood,
but it is recognized in national and international declarations and bills of
rights, constitutions, and the like. Yet, in multicultural societies - and
especially in democratic societies that adopt a policy of multiculturalism -
the tensions and conflicts between the right to freedom of religion and
other values are not negligible. And they show no signs of diminishing.
This situation arguably has led - or, at the very least, may lead - to
the violation of rights. It may also constitute a real threat to social unity,
and challenge even the thin, formal social unity that such societies have in
part because of the emphasis on the equality of different cultural groups.
Diversity and plurality of religion, ethnicity, culture, and the like, are facts
of life in many of the nations of the world, and they reflect values that
democratic societies rightly defend. But to respond to problems of tension
or conflict by imposing rigid or excessive limits on freedom of religion or
the expression of religious heritage or on other fundamental values risks
running counter to the foundational principles of modern democratic states.
So, when we consider how we can best respect and preserve
religious and cultural heritages, and how we can allow the broadest range
of religious freedom - and limit abuses of it - secularism offers a fruitful
option. Nevertheless, it must be a secularism that does not marginalize
freedom of religion or religious expression - i.e., it must be what I have
called 'positive secularism.' At the practical level, a society that adopts
other forms of secularism - what I have called 'negative' and 'mitigated'
secularism - will be the worse for it, for it divides not only societies but
believers against themselves. Those with religious convictions will try to
avoid being involved in these conflicts by withdrawing from the public
sphere, leaving their views unheard and their talents underused. Moreover,
at the theoretical level, 'negative' and 'mitigated' secularism run the risk of
establishing themselves as arbiters of religious doctrine and of violating
basic rights of its citizens.
A 'positive' secularism aims at avoiding these results. It is a
secularism that is compatible with the value of diversity and of a multicultural
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society - though we should note that, despite the way in which modern
democratic societies have evolved, the recognition of this value of diversity
does not logically require multiculturalism. Indeed, support for a multicultural
society is consistent with working for the direct or indirect recognition of
broad cultural values, a common good, or even natural law.
It is here that philosophers can make a particular contribution.
They can serve to prepare the intellectual and social ground for a policy of
positive secularism that includes freedom of religion and the expression of
religious heritage, in the short term, but also to defend the necessity of
broad cultural values - and even a common good - in the long term. This
task will undoubtedly be an arduous one, particularly as it challenges some
of the dominant ideas of our times. But not to take on such a task is to risk
abandoning the recognition and respect of one of humanity's most
fundamental rights.
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